Hard Partition, Soft Partition, and Barriers

An article in today’s Globe and Mail raises the possibility of partitioning Afghanistan:

A weak, partitioned Afghanistan may not be the best or even a desirable outcome. Yet, it will be far better than an Afghanistan that dissolves into chaos. And infinitely better than one in which the medieval Taliban return to power.

Perhaps, but a lot of the trouble there is not inter-ethnic strife but inter-clan strife within the Pathans/Pushtuns. In any case there is already a “soft partition” of Afghanistan due to the role of the Northern Alliance in ousting the Taliban.

Still, I am broadly positive towards separation in general as a way of dealing with conflict (see here). It is not perfect, but it is often the most realistic option.

There are quite a few separation barriers of various kinds. Let’s take a brief tour.

First stop is Korea and the infamous DMZ. In this case, it would have been much better if Korea had not been divided into Soviet and US military zones. That was an almost accidental or inadvertent division, certainly not a necessary separation.

One of the newest barriers is the fence built by Israel along its border with Egypt in the Sinai desert. Its hard to see why anyone would object to this: it was built to stop illegal immigrants getting into Israel through the desert.

If Israel’s border fence is acceptable, then so are a range of other fences designed to prevent influxes of illicit migrants: the US partial fence along its Mexico border; also India’s fence being built along the Bangladesh border.

It is a different story with the the Israeli wall in the West Bank. The good part: it keeps out suicide bombers. The bad part: Israel erected it within Palestinian territory. Had it been along the border, it would have been justified.

Some other barriers were created to separate warring groups, such as the Green Line between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and the many barriers between Protestant and Catholic areas in Belfast. I regard these as useful and necessary. It should not be a surprise that in both cases barriers helped bring an end to the fighting.

Overall, then, two cheers for separating barriers. They are not optimal. It would be good if they were not needed. But what realistic alternative is there?

A fascinating book on this subject is Walls by Marcello di Cintio (I mentioned it here). He travelled to the barriers in Western Sahara (a berm and minefield to keep out insurgents fighting for its independence); Ceuta and Mellila the Spanish enclaves in Morocco (fences to keep out illegal migrants); the Indo-Bangladesh fence, the West Bank wall, the green line in Nicosia, Cyprus; the US-Mexico fences; the barriers in Belfast; and a fence in Montreal.

Ethnoracial War in Mali

In the wake of the French offensive in Mali, the Malian army, while not notably useful in fighting other soldiers, is now showing its true vocation by targeting civilians of its ethnoracial enemies for summary execution.

Reports suggesting that the mainly black African Malian army, drawn largely from the south, has targeted Arabs and ethnic Tuaregs from the north expose a racial aspect to the war here which has been hidden by the emphasis on western troops fighting a war against Islamist insurgents, the BBC’s Mark Doyle in Mali says. (BBC)

Well done France!

Meanwhile, the deep background:

• we are seeing a fight between pastoralists (from the arid North) and sedentary farmers (from the watered South) of the kind Ibn Khaldun had described;

• we are also seeing a fight between Tuareg people originally from the Mahgreb (so supra-Saharan) and sub-Saharan peoples.

These are the latest iteration of an ancient conflict.

The West African force that is supposed to take over from France will of course be composed of the ethnic allies of the Southerners. Expect it to side with them.

Instead of making a fuss about Islamists, and ending up causing more trouble, it would be salutary if the West thought more carefully about how separation could solve such ethnoracial conflicts.

The Descent of the Arab Spring

Early on, the Arab Spring seemed an inspiring story about the oppressed rising up against their oppressors. But now it looks more like a depressing story of descent into barbaric sectarian, ethnic, and religious division.

Case in point: Syria.

The Arab Spring in Syria is becoming more and more an ethnic-religious war.

It’s a Sunni-vs-Shia showdown. Fundamentalist Sunnis are in the vanguard of fighting the Alawi regime. Sunni countries (Saudi, Gulf, Turkey) are helping them. Shia countries (Iran, Iraq) are helping the regime. The Free Syrian Army is an umbrella, but real military power lies with several militias. One of the militias, the al-Nusra Front, has been denounced as a terrorist group by the US. Videos show rebel atrocities such as beheadings and desecrating a Shia place of worship.

As for reports that the regime is collapsing, Patrick Cockburn reports from Damascus in The Independent that he is doubtful:

the best informed Syrians and foreign diplomats say, on the contrary, that the most recent rebel attacks in the capital had been thrown back by a government counteroffensive. They say that the rebel territorial advances, which fuelled speculation abroad that the Syrian government might implode, are partly explained by a new Syrian army strategy to pull back from indefensible outposts and bases and concentrate troops in cities and towns.

The polyethnic character of Middle Eastern states is one of the basic reasons why the Arab Spring rotated from a story of liberation to one of sectarian barbarism. Insecurity breeds fear which leads to seeking security in the group. The group is ususually not a nation but some combination of a lineage, an ethnicity, or a religious sect.

In an earlier post, I tentatively suggested separation of the groups. Otherwise we are likely to see ongoing war, ethnic cleansing, and instability.

What To Do About Eastern Congo

The main predicament in Eastern Congo is that some 25 militias operate in North and South Kivu provinces. (The BBC has a list and a map.) They subsist by taxing mines, roads, and market towns, along with some outright plundering of peasants.

Why is Eastern Congo so lawless?

1. The general tendency to predatory rule in Africa, made worse by:
2. A fairly dense population to prey upon, thanks to rich volcanic soil;
3. Minerals to loot, such as tin, gold and coltan;
4. Immigration: Tutsi and Hutu settlers who intruded upon the existing ethnies;
5. Distance: close to Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, but far from Kinshasa, the Congolese capital;

So, what is to be done?

Separation is perhaps the most feasible option. If there were a smallish new independent state of Kivu, it might follow Rwanda (and the town of Rutshuru) in being ruled by a competent and disciplined Tutsi regime. This is far from perfect, of course, but is probably better than the status quo. It would not end the predation, but it might make it more orderly.

Mali: Separation for the Tuareg Makes Sense

Tuaregs seized the Saharan north of Mali in March 2012. Worried by this and by the rise of Islamists, in October the UN Security Council, France, and Ecowas began planning an intervention.

So, Ecowas, the West African grouping dominated by Nigeria, will probably police, in imperial style, the northerly desert possessions of Mali. And, France will probably give weapons to Bamako. No doubt the French will use such euphemisms as “capacity-building” as they arm whomever useful they can find in Bamako.

This effort at repressing the resentful and increasing the power of the undeserving hardly seems wise. Can outsiders even be sure they know who is who there? Are there any good guys there?

Instead, why not let the Tuaregs of the Saharan north separate from the south? A bonus: the Tuareg want to separate, but the Islamists don’t.

The Tuareg are an unusual ethnie. A Berber people, they spread south from the Maghreb into the Sahel after camels were domesticated. Thanks to their skills with desert and camel, they long controlled the trans-Saharan caravan trade between Timbuktu and the Maghreb.

(Earlier thoughts on Mali here.)

To Separate or to Unite

Frank Jacobs and Parag Khanna in The NYT speculate on areas of the world that might either break-up or unite.

I’m generally for separating ethnic groups in conflict, so let’s take a look.

First, Jacobs and Khanna’s envisaged break-ups:

1-Mali. I am mildly for the Tuaregs of the North to separate. Quite what form that might best take remains to be seen.

2-Belgium. A good idea. Walloons and Flemings are drifting apart. What to do with Brussels is the limiting problem here.

3-Congo. I’m agnostic. The problem is less rival ethnicities and more predatory rulers at all levels. Separation will not solve that problem.

4-Somalia. A good idea. The northern part (Somaliland) is already de facto separate. Somaliland should be recognized as sovereign.

5-Syria. I’m tentatively for separating Alawi and Sunni. Full break-up may not be practicable, but autonomous areas may be.

6-Kurds. Already the Iraq Kurds have autonomy, which has been a positive development. Shows the benefits of separation.

7-Pakistan. Many parts of Pakistan already have a fair amount of autonomy. Afghanistan may benefit from separating the Pushtuns from the others.

Jacob and Khanna’s potential unifications:

8-Arab Gulf. What for?

9-Azerbaijan uniting with the Azeris in Iran. No need.

10-China & E Siberia. Why? China has no historic claim to Eastern Siberia.

11-Korea. Let us hope it happens one day, peacefully.

(See also Steve Saideman’s comments.)

Separation in Syria

Syria continues its civil war, with some 20,000 deaths so far. The idea of separating Alawi and Sunni is tempting. But is it feasible?

Nir Rosen traveled among the Alawi. Some of what he reports supports separation, some not.

There is de facto separation of the Sunnis from Alawis:

As we drove through areas he didn’t know he would ask people how to avoid Sunni towns. In some areas locals had plotted circuitous routes through Alawite and Christian towns, with arrows spraypainted on walls in one village pointing to the next so that bus drivers and others could avoid opposition strongholds.

Plus, ethnic militas are growing:

Alawites aren’t wrong to feel that for all the fury of its repression, the state is at a loss to know how to protect them. It is this feeling, above all, that has led to the growth of the increasingly powerful independent loyalist militias [called shabiha] who act with impunity and often embarrass the regime.

Still, there are some big blockages to separation. Though the opposition is all Sunni, the regime still has support from all groups.

Sunni officers and soldiers belong to some of the most elite army units such as the 4th Division and the Republican Guard, and many opposition intellectuals have admitted that if the government’s base was confined to Alawites, it would have fallen long ago.

Do the Alawi want separation? Apparently not, at least currently.

one hears of no such thing [a separate state] from the Alawites themselves. Syria has long been their central project, and their mode of involvement has been to leave their villages and move towards a version of modernity. It is conceivable that they will end up in some form of autonomous enclave as a result of a civil war in which the opposition gains the upper hand, but it is not their wish. They believe they are fighting for the old Ba’athist ideals of Syrian and Arab nationalism.

Yet that could change.
Maybe an Alawite entity would not be viable.

the old Alawite heartlands have never had much in the way of utilities or employment opportunities and the community would be dependent on outside backers such as Russia or Iran. A Lebanese solution for Syria, in which different areas have different outside backers, may be the end result, but it is nobody’s goal.

Not so sure why having “outside backers” is considered so bad.
The bottom line: separation is not perfect (nothing is) and faces many obstacles but may be worth considering.